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JREWORD 
his study originated because concern was expressed by government space system 
lanners that the potential capabilities of the space shuttle may not be fully 
xploited in future space systems. 
:hese space shuttle capabilities are expected to provide the following: 
1. On-orbit mating of components, subassemblies and assemblies. 
2. Satellite retrieval and return to earth. 
3. On-orbit satellite check-out, repair, refueling and testing. 
Because the shuttle has these capabilities it was postulated that reliability 
and test requirements might be reduced for the entire acquisition cycle for 
spacecraft. 
The original paper was given at the Sixth Aerospace Testing Seminar at Los 
Angeles on March 11 - 13, 1981, and covered spacecraft designed built and 
tested by LMSC and flown using expendable launch vehicles over a ten-year 
period through 1978. Today's paper is an update and an abbrr.viated summary 
of that earlier paper. It covers additional history through 1981. 
PURPOSE 
The purpose of the study is to answer the following questions: 
1. In the shuttle era, is it necessary and cost effective to provide highly 
redundant spacecraft since they can be retrieved from orbit? 
2. Are extremely extensive environmental tests still necessary at the system 
level? 
The experience of LMSC's many spacecraft over a 12-year historical period can 
be extremely useful in providing data to help assess the value of redundancy 
and systems test programs. 
BASIS OF STUDY 
The study analyzed the history of 67 spacecraft over a 12-year period. Each 
of these were looked at in two different ways. For each spacecraft the follow-
ing assumptions were made: 
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1. Redundancies but no environmental system acceptance testing. The study 
estimated what the duration of spaceflight operating time would have been 
without environmental system testing but with the redundancies of the 
actual spacecraft. 
2. Environmental systems acceptance testing but no redundancies. The study 
estimated the duration of spaceflight operating days with the systems 
environmental test performed but with the assumption that all .~edundancies 
.... 
had been removed. 
TEST! NG PROGRAM 
Each of the spacecraft reviewed were subjected to comprehensive system environ-
mental acceptance tests in accordance with MIL-STD-1540 as amended by contractual 
documents. A typical sequence is as follows: 
1. Serial System Test (verify component capability) 
2. Baseline integration 
3. EMC 
4. Functional 
5. Acoustic 
6. Functional 
7. Pyro shock 
8. Functional 
9. Mechanical Release Systems check 
10. Functional 
11. Pressure leak 
12. Functional 
13. Booster compatibility 
14. Functional 
15. Weight and CG 
16. Alignment 
17. Functional 
18. Thermal Vacuum Cycling 
2 temperature cycles minimum at +100 F to +1000 F in a vacuum, 10-5 Torr. 
First 4 days, thermal balance 
(a) Verify equipment thermal design 
(b) Verify analytical thermal models 
(c) Verify heating and cooling system performance margins 
for hot and cold extremes for both primary and back-up 
circuits. 
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19. Functional 
20. Antenna deployment 
21. Final functional 
22. Mechanical preparations 
23. Confidence tests 
24. Shipping preparations 
25. Ship 
NOTE: During thermal vacuum testing redundant equipment is exercised 
separately (an together if applicable), and, components are not 
allowed to exceed acceptance test temperature levels. 
In addition to the system tests, each component received an acceptance test prior 
to being installed in the spacecraft. A typical test sequence is as follows: 
1. Functional 
2. Random vibration (3 axes) 
3. Functional 
4. Thermal vacuum cycling (5 cycles, 75 hours) at -100 F to +1400 F 
5. Functional 
6. Leak 
7. Functional 
8. Burn-in thermal cycling (30 cycles, 330 hours) at -100 F to +1400 F 
9. Final functional 
Ground Rules of Study (See typical methodology chart) 
Case 1. Redundancy but no environmental testing. Each spacecraft history 
was reviewed to determine the number of days in system environmental 
acceptance testing until a critical equipment repetitive failure 
occurred. (Ambient system test operating time was not counted 
because we assumed it would be done even if no environmental 
testing were performed). If no second failure occurred in system 
test the spaceflight operating time was counted up to the second 
fa i1 ure. 
Case 2. Environmental testing but no redundancies. Each spacecraft operating 
history was reviewed to determine the point at which the first mission 
critical failure occurred on a redundant pair. The number of succes-
ful spacecraft operating days would have ended at this time if no 
redundancy was aboard. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
Significant reductions in the number of achieved days would have occurred without 
system testing or redundancies. The following is tabular summary: 
67 SPACECRAFT 
ACHIEVED DAYS 
REDUNDANCY ONLY (NO ENVIRONMENTAL TESTING) 
ENVIRONMENTAL TESTING ONLY (NO REDUNDANCY) 
TOTAL SYSTEM FAILURES 
TOTAL FLIGHT FAILURES 
From the above it can be concluded that--
CUMULATIVE TOTALS 
29,270 ACTUAL 
5,584 EST. 
8,812 EST. 
357 
119 
I. Spacecraft with the same redundancies as used in the past, but eliminating 
systems environmental acceptance testing would have to be delivered at 19% of 
the current cost to provide the same effective on-orbit days. 
2. Spacecraft without redundancies, but subjected to the current systems environ-
mental acceptance testing would have to be delivered at 30% of the current 
cost to provide the same effective on-orbit days. 
3. Environmental testing appears to be more effective than redundancy in increas-
ing on-orbit mission days. 
4. The present practices of providing redundancy of critical components and environ-
mentally testing the spacecraft are cost effective and should be continued into 
the shuttle era. 
5. 357 potential on-orbit failures which could have been mission critical were 
detected during systems environmental acceptance testing. 
6. In the shuttle era, these spacecraft would need to be retrieved for repair 3 to 
5 times more often if they did not have redundancy or system environmental test-
ing. This would be a significant economic impact in addition to the potential 
mission time value loss that cannot be estimated in dollars. 
The final result ~f this study is that LHSC is convinced of the significant value of 
redundancy in spacecraft and systems environmental testing and such techniques should 
be carried forward into the shuttle era. 
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METHODOLOGY - TYPICAL 
~ BEGINNING OF SYSTEM TEST 
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C - FLIGHT TERMINATION WITH REDUNDANCY, 
NO ENVIRONMENTAL TESTS 
BEGINNING OF FLIGHT 
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SYSTEMS TEST OPERATING TIME 
~ THERMAL VACUUM TEST 
o AHBI ENT TEST 
~ ACOUSTIC/POST ~ ACOUSTI C TEST 
, 
\] 
CRITICAL FAILURE WITH 
REDUNDANCY 
CRITICAL FAILURE WITHOUT 
REDUNDANCY 
NO REPETITIVE FAILURE OF SAME 
, TYPE OF REDUNDANCY 
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DATA BASE 
o ANALYZED SYSTEMS TEST AND FLIGHT DATA FOR 
SIX PROGRAMS TOTALING 67 SPACECRAFT OVER A 
12 YEAR PERIOD 
o ANALYZED SYSTEM TEST FAILURE DATA AND 
DETERMINED SYSTEMS TEST OPERATING HOURS 
o ACCUMULATED A TOTAL OF 29,270 FLIGHT 
OPERATING DAYS (80 SPACECRAFT YEARS) 
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REFERENCE: PROCEEDINGS - INSTITUTE OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
SCIENCES, SIXTH AEROSPACE TESTING SEMINAR, 
11-13 MARCH, 1981 
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PURPOSE OF STUDY 
o EVALUATE VALUE OF REDUNDANCY 
o EVALUATE NECESSITY FOR SYSTEM 
ENVIRONMENTAL TESTS 
," 
o DETERMINE: IS ELIMINATION OF 
REDUNDANCY OR SYSTEM ENVIRONMENTAL 
TESTING A SOUND, COST-EFFECTIVE 
MEASURE? 
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ACCEPTANLt I t..) I 1\ ........ _ 
PARTS 
~ 
- ACTIVE: JANTXV AND CLASS B SCREENING OR BETTER 
- PASSIVE: E-REL SCREENING 
BOXES (LATER BOXES RECEIVED MORE TEMP CYCLES & BURN-IN) 
- VIBRATION: -RANDOM, 3 AXIS 
- THERMAL VACUUM: 1 TO 15 CYCLES 
- BURN-IN: HI TEMP, 100 TO 500 HRS, 
LAST 100 HRS FAILURE FREE 
ALL ITEMS PREVIOUSLY QUALIFIED AT HIGHER 
ENVIRONMENTAL LEVELS 
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SYSTEM TEST 
P¥RO HI T/V 
PROGRAM ACOUSTIC DEPLOY PRE S S. (MINIMUM) 
A 1 M X 32H 
2-
B 1M X X X 
C X· X X 200H 00 
6- "'11:0 
."ffi t'f 0-
"'f 0 2 
-..l) 0 2M X 200 ::o~ 
.0." 
8- e: ;0:" ):or,) 
r- 'i' ~-E 1 M X X 70 -< (;l 
F 1 • 5 M X X 1 4-0 
o = DAYS 
M = MINUTES 
H = HOURS 
- = CYCLES 
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SYSTEM TEST DATA GUIDELINES 
FUNCTIONAL FAILURES'ONLY 
ELIMINATED FROM DATA BASE: 
0 TEST FAILURES TRACED TO TEST EQUIPMENT 
0 TEST FAILURES TRACED TO .PROCEDURES 
0 TEST FAILURES TRACED TO HUMAN ERROR 
0 NON-CRITICAL EQUIPMENT FAILURES 
I • 
0 UNVERIFIED FAILURES 
0 DEGRADING/NON-CATASTROPHIC FAILURES 
0 HYDRAULIC/PNEUMATIC LEAKS 
ACCOUNTABLE FAILURES: 
o ALL OTHERS 
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BASIS FOR REDUNDANCY/TEST RATIONALE 
CASE 1: REDUNDANCY BUT NO ENVIRONMENTAL TESTING 
A. THE NUMBER OF DAYS IN SYSTEM TEST UNTIL 
A CRITICAL EQUIPMENT REPETITIVE FAILURE 
OCCURRED 
B. IF NO REPETITIVE FAILURES OCCURRED DURING 
SYSTEM TEST, CONTINUED THE SEARCH INTO 
THE FLIGHT PERIOD 
CASE 2: ENVIRONMENTAL TESTS BUT NO REDUNDANCY 
THE NUMBER OF SPACE FLIGHT DAYS BEFORE THE 
FIRST REDUNDANT EQUIPMENT FAILURE OCCURRED. 
NOTE: SINGLE REDUNDANCY (ONE BACKUP BOX) ONLY WAS 
E V A L U ATE D • I N ACT U A.L P R ACT ICE, S 0 M E E G U I P MEN T S 
HAVE MULTIPLE BACKUPS • 
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METHODOLOGY - TYPICAL 
~ BEGINNING OF SYSTEM TEST 
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SYSTEMS TEST OPERATING TIME 
~ THERMAL VACUUM TEST 
o AMBIENT TEST 
~ ACOUSTIC/POST ~ ACOUSTIC TEST 
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CRITICAL FAILURE WITH 
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CRITICAL FAILURE WITHOUT 
REDUNDANCY 
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SUMMARY OF STUDY RESULTS 
S/C OPERATING DAYS THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN 
ACHIEVED UNDER THE ASSUMED CONDITIONS 
ASSUMPTION 
.., 
DAYS 
o REDUNDANCY BUT NO SYSTEM ENVIRONMENTAL TESTS 5,58~ 
o ENVIRONMENTAL TESTING BUT NO REDUNDANCY 8,81 2 
ACTUAL LENGTH OF S/C OPERATING TIME 29,270 
TOTAL NUMBER OF SYSTEM TEST FAILURES 357 
TOTAL NUMBER OF FLIGHT FAILURES 1 1 9 
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ON-ORBIT TIME RATIOS 
REDUNDANCY, NO ENVIRONMENTAL TEST -
i ENVIRONMENTAL TEST, NO REDUNDANCY -
-~ Lockheed Missiles & Space Company, Inc. 
" 
5584-
29,270 
8,81 2 
29,270 
19% 
30% 
00 
""':0 
."e 
0:2 i~ 
0"" C )lt ~ ., ~~'j 
:j.-
..... w 
EFFECTIVENESS 
ENVIRONMENTAL TEST 
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CON C L U::> 1 U 1'4 .) 
THIS HISTORICAL EVALUATION HAS CONVINCED 
LMSC OF THE SIGNIFICANT VALUE OF REDUNDANCY 
IN S/C AND THE NEED FOR A RIGOROUS ENVIRON-
MENTAL SYSTEMS lEST. 
IN THE SHUTTLE ERA, REDUNDANCY & SYSTEM 
TESTING WILL EXTEND THE TIME BETWEEN 
RETRIEVALS BY FACTORS OF 3 TO 5. 
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